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The literature on social preferences, since its inception, has displayed
a signiﬁcant interest in understanding altruism — deﬁned as the
principle or practice of concern for thewelfare of others. Both theoretical
and experimental studies continue to analyze and explain the possible
components that affect altruistic decisions. It is intuitive that along
with other factors, one's altruistic behavior can be inﬂuenced by income
effects. Except for a few recent developments, the existing literature,
however, has abstracted away from this issue. Speciﬁcally, how altruistic
behavior is affected by a change in income — that has no effect on
inequality — has never been investigated. In this paper we aim to ﬁll
this gap. We modify relevant existing theoretical models and run ae Centre for Behavioural and
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V. This is an open access article undesimple dictator game to answer this question. It turns out that in cases
where inequality is not salient, income effects are explainedwith impure
altruism.
In a standard dictator game a subject (the dictator) decides how
much money to allocate between himself and another passive subject
(the recipient). Both the dictator and the recipient are given a show-
up fee, and the dictator is then asked to divide an extra amount between
himself and the recipient. It is observed that a substantial proportion of
dictators allocate a non-trivial share (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe
et al., 1994; Camerer, 2003; List and Cherry, 2008; Oxoby and
Spraggon, 2008). Since its introduction in the present form, this game
has often been used to understand altruism, as the dictator does not
otherwise have any incentive to share the money with the recipient.
Altruism and social preference theories (Andreoni and Miller, 2002;
Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006) such as pure
altruism (Becker, 1974), inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), impure altruism (Andreoni, 1989, 1990)
and conditional altruism (Konow, 2010) explain this seemingly non-
rational behavior of dictators. Whereas pure altruism assumes that the
donor gets utility purely from thewell-being of the receivers, inequality
aversion theories hypothesize that donors incur disutility from inequality
and that, in turn, motivates altruism. Impure altruism theory, on the
other hand, hypothesize that donors incur utility from the wellbeing of
the recipient, but also earn a ‘warm-glow’ utility from the giving itself.
Conditional altruism theory, in addition, incorporates social norms andr the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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broader discussion and comparison of each of these theories.
We are interested in analyzing the relationship between a pure
income effect and altruism, and in understanding the underlying
theoretical mechanism behind the relationship. To study this in a
dictator game, one needs to vary the common show-up fee equally for
both the dictator and the recipient. Interestingly enough, the effects of
show-up fees in dictator game has seldom been the focus of analyses.1
Whereas a small number of existing studies are interested in understand-
ing the effects of show-up fee inequality (between the dictator and the
recipient) on altruism, this particular design has never been studied in
the literature. In this study, in different treatments we vary a show-up
fee common to both the dictator and the recipient (£0.5, £5, £10, £15,
and £20), but keep an extra amount (£10) — that is to be allocated by
the dictator — the same across treatments. This frame is also a stylized
representation of situations in which an economic agent has the
opportunity to be generous to another agent of the same social or income
stratum— be it rich to rich, or poor to poor. It resembles circumstances in
the ﬁeld such as sending remittances to family of similar income status
(Rapoport and Docquier, 2006), comparison of local charities in high
income and low income geographical areas (countries or states), family
transfers (Laferrere and Wolff, 2006), inter-generational benevolent
behavior such as behaving in an eco-friendly manner to leave a better
environment for future generations (Popp, 2001) etc.
Theoretical and behavioral predictions of this framing can bederived
from the standard social preference theories and from the observations
in the meta-analysis of Engel (2010). In the course of this paper we
derive that the inequality aversion theories suggest a non-increasing
and sometimes strictly decreasing relationship between the common
show-up fee and dictator giving, whereas the impure altruism theory
suggests the opposite. Combining the existing experimental studies,
Engel (2010, pp. 595), in his meta-analysis, observes
“In the standard dictator game, the recipient is poor while the dicta-
tor is rich. If the recipient also receives an endowment upfront …
this strongly reduces giving… if the recipient has received a positive
endowment at the start of the interaction, the reduction is almost
perfectly proportional to the size of the endowment…”
Complying with the impure altruism theory, and contrasting with
the inequality aversion theories (or the results stated in the meta-
analysis above), we observe a monotone increase in dictator giving
with an increase in the common show-up fee.
This analysis is closely related to the research by Korenok et al.
(2012). They employ a strategy method in which each dictator makes
eight decisions for varying show-up fees. When the show-up fee of
the dictators is constant but that of the recipients' increases from zero
to the same amount of thedictator's, dictators steadily decrease the
amount passed to the recipients. It is concluded, hence, that the main
motivation of altruism is other-regarding preferences and not warm-
glow. This is extended in Korenok et al. (2013). Introducing a price of
giving and an endowment to the recipient, they show that a vast
majority of the behavior of the dictator can be explained with a theory
of impure altruism. The current study is also related to the idea of
conditional altruism (Konow, 2010) that incorporates disutility out of
deviation from moral norms, and effects similar to warm-glow that re-
lates to long term utility such as prestige or social approval. Konow1 Income/endowment effect in the ultimatum game (Knetsch, 1989; Bolton et al., 1998;
Armantier, 2006) is well observed. In the dictator game, dictators aremore self-interested
if they earn the amount to be allocated, and aremore generous if recipients earn it (Rufﬂe,
1998; Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008). The stake of giving also exhibits a
signiﬁcant effect on giving behavior (List and Cherry, 2008; Johansson-Stenman et al.,
2005; Carpenter et al., 2005). The effect of different initial split of the pie has also been in-
vestigated (starting with Bolton and Katok, 1998) and it is found that with higher initial
share to the recipient, dictator giving decreases. However, only Konow (2010) and
Korenok et al. (2012) explicitly introduce the saliency of show-up fees in a dictator game.(2010) employs a subsidy frame among others and shows, again, that
the recipient show-up fee has signiﬁcant effects on the dictator giving.
He concludes support for conditional altruism.
2. Experimental design
We ran 5 treatments with 3 sessions under each treatment. 16 sub-
jects participated in each session. All the subjects were students at the
University of East Anglia, UK, recruited through the online recruitment
system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Our design is a variant of the Forsythe
et al. (1994) Dictator game. The only difference is that the subjects
were given a common show-up fee and that was common and salient
knowledge. The treatments differed only in the show-up fees given to
the subjects. Dictators were then given an additional £10 and were
allowed the choice to allocate the additional amount between him/
herself and his/her co-participant (i.e., the recipient). Table 1 summarizes
the treatment description.
Although our designs are similar, there also are several differences
between the studies of Korenok et al. (2012) or Konow (2010) and
the current study. First, the existing studies focus on the effects of the
dictator–recipient show-up fee difference on dictator giving, but our
focus is on the effect of the change in common show-up fee on dictator
giving. Thus, whereas those frames are appropriate to study giving
behavior when inequality is salient, ours is more appropriate to under-
stand the impact of a pure income effect on altruism. We employ a
between-subject design, whereas Korenok et al. (2012) use a strategy
method. Our design also differs with that of Konow (2010) in terms of
decision space, and we ﬁnd that the experimental results can be
explained by the theory of impure altruism.
In each session, subjects were randomly and anonymously placed
into one of 8 pairs andwere assigned the role of either a dictator or a re-
cipient. They then received information about their show-up fees,
which was the same for all participants in a particular session. Each
session consisted of two parts. In the ﬁrst part, dictators were asked to
allocate the additional £10 between themselves and the recipient, up
to a fraction of 1 penny. In the second part, recipients had to guess the
amount theywould receive from the dictator. The instruction of the sec-
ond part was given only after the decisions of the ﬁrst part were made,
and it was mentioned beforehand, in the instruction of the ﬁrst part,
that recipient's decision is payoff irrelevant to the dictator. This was
done to ensure no strategic interaction between dictators' choices
with recipient's guesses. Demographic information such as age, gender,
nationality, study area of eachparticipating subjectswere collected after
the experiment. The experiment was run manually and each subject's
decision was anonymous to the experimenters. Subjects could partici-
pate in only one session. On average, each session took about 45 min
and the average earnings of subjects (dictator and recipient together)
across treatments were £15.10. However, average earnings varied
over treatments between £5.5 (Treatment 1) and £25 (Treatment 5).
The instructions are included in Appendix B.
3. Theoretical predictions
In this section we derive analytical predictions regarding dictator
giving with the theories of inequality aversion and impure altruism,Table 1
Treatment description.
Treatment Common
show-up
fee
Additional
amount
to be divided
Number of
subjects
per session
Number
of sessions
Number of
independent
observations
Treatment 1 £0.50 £10 16 3 24
Treatment 2 £5 £10 16 3 24
Treatment 3 £10 £10 16 3 24
Treatment 4 £15 £10 16 3 24
Treatment 5 £20 £10 16 3 24
Fig. 2. Show-up fee — dictator giving relationship: ratio form inequality aversion.
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ory of pure altruism, and compare the results of conditional altruism
with impure altruism theory, but do not provide corresponding proofs.
According to the theory of pure altruism (Becker, 1974; Andreoni,
1989), the utility of a donor depends only on the ﬁnal payoffs of himself
and the receiver. However, the predictions of this model are often not
clear. In the current context, it can easily be shown that thepure altruism
theory does not provide a speciﬁc prediction for an income effect. Giving
may stay the same, go up, or go down as a result of an increase in the
common show-up fees. Moreover, the predictions of the pure altruism
theory are tested and rejected in the literature by Andreoni (1993)
and several others over the course of time; and hence we focus on the
alternative theories in the current study.
3.1. Linear form inequality aversion
Inequality aversion theories capture the preference of the agents for
fairness and deﬁance to inequality. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) suggest a
linear model of inequality aversion in which a donor's utility decreases
with the difference in donor and receiver payoff. For a two-player case,
this model can be described as
ui ¼ xi−αi max xj−xi;0
h i
−βimax xi−xj;0
h i
; i≠ j ð1Þ
where ui is the utility of subject i; xi, xj are payoffs of i and j
respectively; and αi, βi are inequality aversion parameters with αi ≥ βi,
and 1 N βi ≥ 0. Let Fi and Fj be the show-up fees and yi and yj be
the allocations of the pie, Y, for a dictator and a recipient respec-
tively. Hence, yi + yj = Y, xi = Fi + yi and xj = Fj + yj. We further
impose Y N Fj − Fi. For a common show-up fee Fi= Fj= F, Proposition
1 states the predicted relationship between the equilibrium amount
given and the show-up fee. Fig. 1 summarizes this in a diagram.
Proposition 1. According to the hypothesis of the linear form inequal-
ity aversion, the amount given remains the same across treatments
dy j

dF ¼ 0
 
.
3.2. Ratio form inequality aversion
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)'s ratio formmodel assumes a decrease
in donor's utility with the asymmetry in the ratio in donor and receiver
payoff. Following the same notation as earlier, for a two-player case
with Fi = Fj = F, this model turns out to be
ui ¼ aixi−bi xi= xj þ xi
 
−1=2
h i2 ð2Þ
where ai≥ 0 and bi N 0 are inequality aversion parameters, yi+ yj= Y,
xi= F+ yi and xj= F+ yj. Proposition 2 and Fig. 2 summarize the show-
up fee–giving relationship.Fig. 1. Show-up fee — dictator giving relatioProposition 2. According to the hypothesis of the ratio form inequality
aversion, the dictator gives a positive amount at zero common show-up
fees. However, giving decreases with an increase in the show-up fee
dy j

dF b 0
 
, until a point afterwhich the dictator keeps thewhole amount
for himself.
3.3. The theory of impure altruism
The theory of impure altruism (Andreoni, 1989, 1990) considers
dictator utility with components of own wellbeing, wellbeing of
the recipient, and a warm-glow component (that reﬂects the joy of
giving) through the amount given. For two players, specify this
model as
ui ¼ ui Fi þ Y−yj; F j þ yj; yj
 
: ð3Þ
Assume that the utility function ui(.) to be strictly quasi-concave and
strictly increasing in all arguments. Proposition 3 and Fig. 3 describe the
derived relationship between equilibrium giving and the common
show-up fee for this model.
Proposition 3. According to the theory of impure altruism an increase
in the show-up fee strictly increases dictator giving dy j

dF N0
 
.
It is to benoted that theprediction of a positive relationship between
the dictator giving and the common show-up fees can also be derived
from models introduced later in the literature with structure similar
or richer to the theory of impure altruism. Here we discuss one of
such richer models. The theory of conditional altruism (Konow, 2010)
considers moral norms in donor decisions and also provides a reﬁned
structure of effects that a warm-glow component supposed to capture.nship: linear form inequality aversion.
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Fig. 3. Show-up fee— dictator giving relationship: impure altruism.
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then under Fi = Fj = F the utility function should be
ui ¼ f i F þ Y−yj
 
−gi F þ yj−
1
2
2F þ Yð Þ
 
þwi yj
 
where the ﬁrst component of the function represents own wellbeing,
the last component is the warm-glow part, and the middle one shows
disutility coming through the deviation of recipient's payoffs from the
moral norm. It is easy to show that under appropriate assumptions
this model's prediction is qualitatively similar to Proposition 3, and we
do not provide a formal proof of the same.
4. Results
As the treatments are run between-subjects, there are 24 indepen-
dent observations in each treatment. We run standard non-parametric
tests and regressions to assess the conﬂicting hypotheses arising from
the theoretical models.
We start with Table 2, which describes the mean and median of
giving in each treatment. It also shows the number of subjects giving
zero and giving £5 as a measure of pure selﬁsh or pure egalitarian be-
havior. Only one subject in the whole experiment allocated more than
£5 to a recipient. The proportion of pure selﬁsh subjects varies between
12.5% and around 20%, whereas the proportion of egalitarian subjects
varies from 4% to 1/3 over treatments. If we consider giving less than
£1, too, as selﬁsh behavior, then the total number of selﬁsh subjects
goes up to 32, and becomes 42% in the50p treatment. Given the sessions
were run manually, these observations are in line with the results from
the existing experiments (Engel, 2010).
One immediate observation fromTable 2 is that the central tendency
of the amount given is steadily increasingwith an increase in the show-
up fee. This is true for bothmean andmedian giving. Fig. 4, showing the
scatter plot of givingwith the average giving per treatment, further sup-
ports this observation. However, it is still to be conﬁrmed if this increase
in giving is statistically signiﬁcant.
To test the same,weﬁrst runnon-parametric tests on thehypothesis of
same distribution of amount given over different show-up fees. This hy-
pothesis is rejected at the 10% level with a Kruskal and Wallis (1952)Table 2
Descriptive statistics of amount given: total.
Show-up fee
# of obs: 120 0.5 5 10 15 20 Total
Mean 1.59 2.12 2.44 2.66 3.12 2.39
Median 1.25 2 2.25 3 3.50 2
Zero 5 5 5 3 3 21
0 b giving b half 18 15 14 15 12 74
Half 1 4 5 6 8 24test. Moreover, with two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann and Whitney,
1947) tests it is rejected that giving in treatments with high show-up
fees is the same as giving in treatments with lower show-up fees.
To test whether the increase in amount given across treatments is
signiﬁcant and robust to other controls, we ﬁrst run a linear regression
with amount given as the dependent variable and show-up fee as the
explanatory variable. The ﬁrst column in Table 3 shows the result of
the regression. The coefﬁcient for show-up fee is positive and signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. It shows that a £1 increase in show-up fee increases
giving by 7.3 pence on average. In the second model we control for
gender, nationality and study areas but show-up fee remains signiﬁcant
with similar impact (6.8 pence increase in giving for a £1 increase in the
show-up fee). Out of all the control variables only gender turns out to be
signiﬁcant and females on average are more generous than their male
counterparts. Because almost a sixth of the dictators gave nothing, the
third and fourth regressions are run with a left-censored Tobit
model.2 However, the direction and signiﬁcance of the results still
remain the same.
The results conﬁrm that the average amount given increases
robustlywith the common show-up fee. Other variations of the controls
(such as other country/study area dummies, age brackets, interaction
variables), non-linear effects of the show-up fee, and other regression
procedures such as a hurdle-model (Mullahy, 1986) did not come out
to be signiﬁcant, did not change the direction of the results and hence
are not reported. In conclusion, a pure income effect—with no implica-
tion on income inequality — positively affects altruism. This result is in
contradiction with Propositions 1 and 2, but not with Proposition 3.
Hence, we conclude that the consequence of pure income effect on
giving can be explained by the theory of impure altruism.5. Discussion
We investigate how a pure income effect inﬂuences altruistic
behavior. In a dictator game we vary the common show-up fee of the
dictator and the recipient, but keep the amount to be shared the same.
Contrary to the predictions of the standard inequality aversion models
and derived results from existing experiments, but in line with the
theory of impure altruism, the dictators give more with an increase in
the common show-up fee.
If our results from the laboratory generalize to the world at large,
then we would expect charity donations to be signiﬁcantly lower at the
time of a recession.3 In addition, according to our results (ceteris paribus)2 The reported values under the Tobit regressions are the coefﬁcients, i.e., the marginal
effects on the latent dependent variable. The signs are the same for themarginal effects on
the expected values.
3 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7946518.stm and the National Council for
Voluntary Organisations and Charities Aid Foundation (2009) report on the effects of re-
cession on charitable giving in the UK. Also see the Giving USA Foundation (2009) report
regarding the same in the USA.
Table 3
Regression of amount given on show-up fee, gender and other controls.
Dependent variable:
amount given
(Linear 1) (Linear 2) (Tobit 1) (Tobit 2)
Intercept 1.647⁎⁎⁎ 1.563⁎⁎ 1.366⁎⁎⁎ 1.352
(0.293) (0.765) (0.350) (0.889)
Show-up fee 0.073⁎⁎⁎ 0.068⁎⁎⁎ 0.082⁎⁎⁎ 0.076⁎⁎⁎
(0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028)
Female 0.745⁎⁎ 0.873⁎⁎
(0.338) (0.393)
Age −0.007 −0.012
(0.024) (0.028)
UK dummy 0.034 0.057
(0.355) (0.413)
Econ dummy −0.127 −0.119
(0.563) (0.652)
# of observations 120 120 120 120
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.076 0.017 0.028
Standard errors are in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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richer country compared to a poorer country, more family transfers
within wealthier families compared to poorer families, and citizens
from the richer countries to be more eco-friendly than their poorer
counterparts (supporting the empirical observation by Popp (2001)
about impure inter-generational altruism in terms of environmental
issues). The current study is also in line with the result obtained by
Holland et al. (2012) in their Anthropology ﬁeld experiment. They left
sealed and stamped letters in the streets of 50 neighborhoods in
London and found that the likelihood of someone posting the letter in
a nearby mailbox is positively correlated with the income-level of the
neighborhood. Finally, the current results match, in spirit, with the
empirical observation by Hoffmann (2011). He ﬁnds that even after con-
trolling for various factors including abilities, richer German citizens
saved more Jewish people at the time of the holocaust compared to the
poorer German citizens.
The main result of our analysis is of interest because existing exper-
imental results to date (such as Korenok et al., 2012 and Konow, 2010)
have shown that in a standard dictator game, results can be explained
with inequality aversion or conditional altruism theories. Crumpler
and Grossman (2008) among others, on the other hand, have shown
that impure altruismcan explain results in dictator gameswith a charity
frame. Our results imply that impure altruism theory can explain results
even in a standard dictator game frame, when income inequality is less
salient.
Finally, several studies (Bolton and Katok, 1998; Brañas-Garza,
2006; Engel, 2010; Konow, 2010; Korenok et al., 2012) show that an in-
crease in the recipient's incomemarks a negative impact on the amount
given by the dictator, and explain the same through inequality aversion.
We observe that if the increase in recipient income is accompanied by
an increase in dictator income, then it can even increase giving. Present-
ing it in another way, unlike the existing studies, we observe that the
dictator may even give less to the recipient if the recipient (and com-
mon) income is lower. In many of the existing designs, the warm-
glow part of impure altruism and the inequality aversion components
work in opposite ways in determining giving. If one of the effects is
made less salient then it is offset by the other effect and the outcome
changes. Hence, to conclude, in some settings inequality aversion may
serve as a better underlying model than impure altruism, whereas in
some other settings impure altruism may ﬁt better. While, as we ﬁnd,
impure altruism works better in explaining income effects, the scope
for exhaustive investigation in this broader topic remains open.Appendix A
A.1. Linear form inequality aversion: proof of Proposition 1
Eq. (1) can be rewritten as:
ui ¼ yi þ Fð Þ−αi max yj þ F
 
− yi þ Fð Þ; 0
h i
−βi max yi þ Fð Þ− yj þ F
 
; 0
h i
¼ Y−yj þ F
 
−αi max 2yj−Y; 0
h i
−βimax Y−2yj;0
h i
:
The dictator would try tomaximize utility with respect to the giving
decision. There can be 2 cases: yj N Y/2 and yj ≤ Y/2. It is easy to show
that the ﬁrst case does not arise. Hence the dictator's optimization
problem boils down to:
max
y j
ui ¼ Y−yj þ F
 
−βi Y−2yj
 
subject to Y=2≥yj≥0:
Let λ1 and λ2 be Lagrangian multipliers. The Lagrangian equation
and the corresponding ﬁrst order conditions are given below.
Li ¼ Y−yj þ F
 
−βi Y−2yj
 
þ λ1yj þ λ2 Y=2−yj
 
∂Li
∂yj
¼−1þ 2βi þ λ1−λ2 ¼ 0 ð4Þ
∂Li
∂λ1
: yj≥0;λ1≥0;λ1yj ¼ 0
∂Li
∂λ2
: Y=2−yj
 
≥0;λ2≥0;λ2 Y=2−yj
 
¼ 0:
Case a: λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0. This implies βi = 1/2, i.e., the dictator is
indifferent between giving any amount between 0 and Y/2. But the
second order condition does not hold.
Case b. λ1 N 0, λ2 = 0 and hence Y/2 N yj = 0. In this case dictator
keeps the whole amount. The required condition from Eq. (4) is
βi b 1/2.
Case c. λ1 = 0, λ2 N 0 and hence yj N 0. Here the dictator gives Y/2.
The required condition for this is βi N 1/2.
Consequently, the equilibrium yj is independent of F. Therefore
under Fehr and Schmidt (1999) structure: dy j

dF ¼ 0; an increase in the
common show-up fee does not have any effect on the giving
behavior. □
A.2. Ratio form inequality aversion: proof of Proposition 2
Eq. (2) can be rewritten as
ui ¼ ai F þ Y−yj
 
−bi F þ Y−yj
 
= F þ yj
 
þ F þ Y−yj
 h i
−1=2
h i2
:
The dictator would try to maximize ui with respect to the giving
decision (yj) subject to Y ≥ yj ≥ 0. Denote μ1 and μ2 as Lagrangian
multipliers. The Lagrangian equation and the corresponding ﬁrst order
conditions are given below.
£i ¼ ai F þ Y−yj
 
−bi
F þ Y−yj
 
F þ yj
 
þ F þ Y−yj
 n o−1=2
2
4
3
5
2
þ μ1yj
þ μ2 Y−yj
 
148 S.M. Chowdhury, J.Y. Jeon / Journal of Public Economics 118 (2014) 143–150∂£i
∂y ¼−
2bi
2F þ Yð Þ2 yj þ bi
Y
2F þ Yð Þ2
 
−ai
 	
þ μ1−μ2 ¼ 0 ð5Þj
∂£i
∂μ1
: yj≥0; μ1≥0; μ1yj ¼ 0
∂£i
∂μ2
: Y−yj
 
≥0; μ2≥0; μ2 Y−yj
 
¼ 0:
Case a. μ2=0, μ1 N 0 and hence yj=0, i.e., the dictator gives nothing.
From Eq. (5) observe that μ1 N 0 implies ai(2F+ Y)2 N biY. Hence, the
required restriction becomes F ≥ [(biY/ai)1/2/2− Y].
Case b. μ1 = 0, μ2 N 0 and hence yj = Y, i.e., the dictator gives the
whole pie. From Eq. (5) observe that μ2 N 0 implies 0 N Y+ ai(Fi +
Fj + Y)2/bi. This is not possible.
Case c. μ1 = μ2 = 0, i.e., an interior solution. Solving we get
yj ¼ 12bi biY−ai 2F þ Yð Þ
2
h i
¼ 12Y− ai2bi 2F þ Yð Þ
2 . Hence, this
boils down to yj ¼ 12 Y− ai2bi 2F þ Yð Þ
2 , with required restric-
tions Fb
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bi=aið ÞY
p
−Y
 
=2 and (ai/bi) N Y . It is easy to check
that the SOC holds. The equilibrium giving implies dy j

dF b0;
i.e., an increase in the common show-up fee will result in
a lower giving in the interior. □
A.3. The theory of impure altruism: proof of Proposition 3
Following Andreoni (1989), deﬁne total payoff of the recipient as
xj = Fj + yj. Then Eq. (3) can be rewritten as:
ui ¼ ui Fi þ F j þ Y−xj; xj; xj−F j
 
:
Assuming interior solution, the optimum level of xj can be solved by
differentiating the above equation with respect to xj and setting it equal
to zero. Hence, the solution can be written as the following implicit
function:
xj ¼ f i Fi þ F j þ Y ; F j
 
where the ﬁrst argument reﬂects the altruism component and the
second argument reﬂects thewarm-glow component of the utility func-
tion. Subtracting Fj from both sides we get
yj ¼ f i Fi þ F j þ Y ; F j
 
−F j: ð6Þ
When both own consumption and charity are normal goods, then
one can argue following Andreoni (1989, pp. 1451) that for the case of
non-neutral transfers: 1≥ dy

j
d Fi
≥− dy

j
d F j
≥0.
Now differentiating Eq. (6) with respect to Fwe ﬁnd:
dyj
dF
¼ f i1
dFi
dF
þ f i1
dF j
dF
þ f i2
dF j
dF
−
dF j
dF
where fi1 is the partial derivative of the function fi with its ﬁrst argu-
ment, and fi2 is the partial derivative for the second argument. So if
both Fi = Fj = F, then
dFi
dF ¼
dF j
dF ¼ 1. Given this and imposing the condi-
tion 1≥ dy

j
d Fi
≥− dy

j
d F j
≥0, we get:
dyj
dF
¼ 2 f i1 þ f i2−1≥0:Hence, yj is increasing in F; i.e., an increase in the common show-up
fee will result in a higher giving in the interior. □
Appendix B
B.1. Instructions for the experiment (baseline case: £10 participation fee)
B.1.1. General instruction
This is an experiment in the area of economic decision making.
Various research agencies have provided funds for this research. The in-
structions are simple. If you follow them closely, then depending on
yourdecision and the decision of the others, you can earn anappreciable
amount of money. The experiment has two parts. At the end of today's
experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. Your identity and
your decisions will also remain private. 16 participants are in today's
experiment.
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other
people's work. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any
kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If
you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and
you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
B.1.2. Your decisions
You have already received a £10.00 participation fee. This experiment
contains the decision problem that requires you to make economic
choices that determine your earnings over and above your participation
fee.
At the beginning of the experiment, youwill be randomly and anon-
ymously placed into one of 8 groups (groups 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8).
Each group consists of 2 types of participants ‘Participant A’ and
‘Participant B’. Again youwill be randomly assigned either as a ‘Participant
A’ or a ‘Participant B’ in your group. Both the group name and your type
will be written in a card given to you at the start of the experiment.
Other participants will not know your group number or your type
(A or B).
Both ‘Participant A’ and ‘Participant B’ are paid £10 each as their re-
spective participation fee. Every Participant A will receive an additional
amount of £10.
B.1.3. Part I. Participant A
Participant A will make the decision to allocate this additional £10
between himself/herself and the Participant B in his/her group. Partici-
pant A can decide to give any amount in British Pounds, between 0.00
and 10.00 (up to two decimal points), to Participant B. Suppose Partici-
pant A gives X to Participant B. Then Participant Awill have the remain-
ing Y = £10.00 − X. The total earnings of Participant A will be the
participation fee plus the share of the additional £10. Hence, earnings
of Participant A = £10 + Y. Earnings of Participant B = £10 + X. See
the following examples for clariﬁcation. All the numbers are in British
pounds:
Example 1. Suppose Participant A decides to give 7.29 to Participant
B. Then the total earnings of Participant B is (participation fee + share
of the additional amount) = 10+ 7.29= 17.29. And the total earnings
of the Participant A is = 10 + (10− 7.29) = 10 + 2.71 = 12.71.
Example 2. Suppose Participant A decides to give 3.37 to Participant
B. Then the total earnings of Participant B is (participation fee + share
of the additional amount) = 10+ 3.37= 13.37. And the total earnings
of the Participant A is = 10 + (10− 3.37) = 10 + 6.63 = 16.63.
Every participant will get a card at the start of the experiment. Line 1
of the card indicates your group number. Line 2 indicates your role in the
experiment. Line 3 shows your participation fee. Line 4 shows the partic-
ipation fee of the other participant in your group. Line 5 shows the addi-
tional amount (£10.00) given to Participant A to be allocated between
himself/herself and the Participant B in the same group. The next lines
are different for Participant A and Participant B.
Participant A's card looks like the one given below. In Line 6, Partic-
ipant A will write a number between £0.00 and £10.00 (up to 2 decimal
149S.M. Chowdhury, J.Y. Jeon / Journal of Public Economics 118 (2014) 143–150points) in the blank space. This is the amount given to Participant B. In
Line 7, Participant A will calculate the amount left for him/her. To calcu-
late this, Participant A will subtract the amount written in line 6 from
£10. Line 8 shows Participant A's total earnings. This will be the partici-
pation fee plus the share of the additional £10. Hence, Participant A will
add line 3 and line 7 and write the number in line 8. Finally, in line 9, Par-
ticipant A calculates the total earnings of Participant B, which is the sum
of line 4 and line 6.1. Your group number: 8
2. Your role: Participant A
3. Your participation fee: £10
4. Participation fee of Participant B: £10
5. Additional amount to be allocated: £10
6. Amount given to Participant B (between 0.00 and
10.00): X = ______
7. Amount left for you: £10− X= ______
8. Your total earnings: £10 + _____ = _____
9. Participant B total earnings: £10 + ____ = ____Here is an example that draws numbers from example 1 in page 2.1. Your group number: 8
2. Your role: Participant A
3. Your participation fee: £10
4. Participation fee of Participant B: £10
5. Additional amount to be allocated: £10
6. Amount given to Participant B (between 0.00 and
10.00): X = £7.29
7. Amount left for you: £10− X= £2.71
8. Your total earnings: £10 + £2.71 = £12.71
9. Participant B total earnings: £10 + £7.29 = £17.29Here is another example that draws numbers from Example 2 in
page 2.1. Your group number: 8
2. Your role: Participant A
3. Your participation fee: £10
4. Participation fee of Participant B: £10
5. Additional amount to be allocated: £10
6. Amount given to Participant B (between 0.00 and
10.00): X = £3.37
7. Amount left for you: £10− X= £6.63
8. Your total earnings: £10 + £6.63 = £16.63
9. Participant B total earnings: £10 + £3.37 = £13.37Participant Awill get 2 minutes tomake his/her decision. Aftermak-
ing the decision, each Participant Awill put his/her card inside the enve-
lope given and seal the envelope.
To summarize, if you are Participant A, make your decision and ﬁll
out the card. But if you are Participant B, you do not have to do anything
in this part of the experiment. The total earnings of Participant A will be
the sum of the participation fee, and the residual amount from the
additional £10 (after giving an amount to Participant B), as calculated
in line 8. Participant A's earnings will not be affected by the decisionsof participant B in the next round. This will conclude the ﬁrst part of
the experiment. Are there any questions?B.1.4. Part II. Participant B
Participant B's card looks like the one given below. Line 6 indicates
participant B's guess about the amount offered to Participant B by Par-
ticipant A. Line 7 shows the total guessed earnings of Participant B,
which is the sum of line 3 and line 6.1. Your group number: 8
2. Your role: Participant B
3. Your participation fee: £10
4. Participation fee of Participant A: £10
5. Total amount to be divided: £10
6. Your guess about the amount offered to you (between 0.00
and 10.00): ____
7. Your guess about your total earnings: £10 + ____ = ____In the previous part of the experiment, Participant A decided to give
any amount between £0.00 and £10.00 (up to two decimal points) to
Participant B. In this part of the experiment, Participant B will have to
guess the amount Participant A has given to him/her. If the guess is
close enough to the actual amount given by Participant A, then Partici-
pant B will get an extra reward of £1.
Suppose Participant A has given X to Participant B. Participant B
guesses that the amount is Z. If the difference between X and Z is less
than or equal to 50 pence, then Participant B will get the £1 reward
over and above the participation fee and the amount given by Partici-
pant A.
Example 1. Suppose Participant A decides to give £7.29 to Participant
B. If Participant B rightfully guesses an amount which is in between
£6.79 and £7.79, then Participant B will get the reward of £1. This is be-
cause £7.29− £0.5 = £6.79 and £7.29 + £0.5 = £7.79. If Participant B
guesses numbers outside this range, then he/she will not get the
reward.
Example 2. Suppose Participant A decides to give £3.37 to Participant
B. If Participant B rightfully guesses an amount which is in between
£2.87 and £3.87, then Participant B will get the reward of £1. This is be-
cause £3.37− £0.5 = £2.87 and £3.37 + £0.5 = £3.87. If Participant B
guesses numbers outside this range, then he/she will not get the
reward.
Participant B will write the guess in Line 6. He/she will also need to
write the total earnings in line 7. This will be the sum of line 3 and line
6. Participant B will get 2 minutes to make his/her decision. After mak-
ing the decision, each Participant Bwill put his/her card inside the enve-
lope given and seal the envelope. The total earnings of Participant B will
be the sum of the participation fee, amount given to him/her by Partic-
ipant A, and the £1 reward (if won). This will conclude the second part
of the experiment. Are there any questions?References
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